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RECENT DECISIONS
governor." However, only two of these states (Mississippi and Vermont)
require a majority of votes for election while the rest require only a
plurality. This is significant in that a deadlock is highly improbable in
these states. Furthermore, it is infrequent that no candidate receives a
majority in states requiring that amount for election. These facts seem to
have influenced the Court since they all deceptively indicate a limited
prospective impact of the decision, i.e., there will be few times when a
legislature must complete a popular election and, thus, violate the Gray
rule. Moreover, the only apparent alternatives to legislative action in the
event of a deadlock are expensive runoffs and new elections. However, a
constitutional right, especially one so sacred as voting rights, should
never be balanced against such practical considerations; notwithstanding,
this is exactly what the Court has done in Fortson v. Morris.
Charles R. Passafiume
CouRTs-Federal-State Relations-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
finds it highly inappropriate to clarify state law relevant to issues raised
in a federal court.
In Re Estate of Girard, 423 Pa. 297, 224 A.2d 761 (1966).
After an adverse decision in the Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania on matters of state law,' the trustees of Girard
College petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for a clarification
of the earlier Girard cases.2 The Pennsylvania court denied the petition,
holding that a due regard for the federal-state system precluded a
clarification;' the court emphatically cautioned that no implications were
to be drawn from their restraint.4
The action in the Federal District Court had been commenced by
guardians of Negro children to enjoin the discriminatory admission
27. As illustrated in the present case:
This is by statutory provision in North Carolina and by constitutional provision in
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
These states require only a plurality of popular votes to elect a governor while
Mississippi and Vermont require a majority and have the same provision as the others in
case of a deadlock in the popular election. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 234, 235 (1966).
1. Commonwealth v. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 323 (1966).
2. In Re Estate of Girard, 423 Pa. 297, 224 A.2d 761 (1966).
3. Id. at 297, 224 A.2d at 762.
4. Ibid.
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practices of Girard College.' The complaint alleged that the fourteenth
amendment and the Pennsylvania Public Accomodations Act prohibited
such a procedure.6 That court concluded that a substantial federal ques-
tion had been raised and that it should exercise pendent jurisdiction over
the state question involved.
7
The district court judge rejected the contention that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court had excluded Girard from the purview of the Public
Accommodations Act, and found that the statute extended to the College.'
The injunction was granted,9 and the trustees petitioned for a clarifica-
tion to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court."°
In finding a clarification to be inappropriate it is submitted that the
Pennsylvania court has adopted a policy contrary to that recommended
and pursued by the United States Supreme Court. Cognizance of the
disharmony inherent in a federal adjudication of issues of state law has
led to the encouragement of procedures which insure state definition of
local law.'
5. 260 F. Supp. 323 (1966). Girard College was established in the will of Stephen Girard
for the education of poor, white males. Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956).
The City of Philadelphia supervised the admission and administration of the institution, but
this action was found subject to the strictures of the fourteenth amendment. Commonwealth
v. Bd. of Directors of City Trusts of the City of Philadelphia, 353 U.S. 230 (1957). Private
trustees were then appointed and the transfer was upheld. In re Girard College Trusteeship,
391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958), cert. denied 357 U.S. 570 (1958).
6. Ibid. The complaint alleged that the state involvement with the College has impreg-
nated its character with an indelible state identity and therefore subjected the operation of
the institution to the strictures of the fourteenth amendment. The Pennsylvania Public
Accomodations Act, Act of May 19, 1887, P.L. 130 as amend. 1936, 18 P.S. 4654 prohibits
discriminatory practices by institutions under the supervision of the Commonwealth. Ex-
cluded from its application are those institutions which are distinctly private.
7. Id. at 332. The court stated that "Some of the constitutional questions presented by
this complaint are on the frontier of the Fourteenth Amendment, but their substantiality
cannot be gainsaid for that." It relied on the case of United Mine Workers of America v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) to establish its jurisdiction over the state question involved. In
that case the Supreme Court said that pendent jurisdiction over state matters would exist if
the federal and state claims arose from a common factual situation.
8. Ibid. Judge Lord was of the opinion that the Public Accomodations Act had received
only cursory attention in the earlier Girard cases. Cf. discussion note 1 supra. He concluded
that since the Act had been used in the earlier cases only to show Pennsylvania's abhorrence
of discrimination, its applicability to Girard College had not been litigated. Interpreting the
statute, he found that Girard was not to be characterized as a private institution exempt
from the scope of the statute.
9. Commonwealth v. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 358 (1966).
10. In Re Estate of Girard, 423 Pa. 297, 224 A.2d 761 (1966). In Lawler v. Common-
wealth, 347 Pa. 568, 33 A.2d 432 (1943), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged that
a petition for clarification is a proper method for bringing to the court's attention an
ambiguous opinion. The procedure calls for a reconsideration of points which had been
previously argued and cannot be employed to raise new matter.
11. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1944), Minnesota v. Nat'l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551
(1940).
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The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that the partition
of power between state and federal courts necessitates that they refrain
from interfering with essentially local questions. 2 To prevent unwitting
interference that court has postponed decisions pending a clarification of
opinions by state courts1 and has remanded cases to state courts for
review. 4 Although these actions were taken after reviewing ambiguous
state decisions, the Court based its decisions on due regard for the integrity
of local jurisdiction. 5
Federal concern for the protection of the states' domain has been
notable since the case of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 6 and has led to a
federal concern for the integrity of state law.' Since the Pennsylvania
court has clarified earlier ambiguous opinions for inferior tribunals, no
reason is apparent why it should not do so for a federal court which is
obligated to follow state law.
The effort to maintain state interpretation of local law has not been
restricted to federal action. To preserve the power to decide state law
legislation has been passed empowering the state supreme court to accept
and answer federal certificates requesting a definition of state law.' This
procedure has been praised as insuring the state's power in a system of
dual tribunals 9
The question of whether the earlier Girard opinion had excluded the
College from the scope of the Public Accomodations Act has generated
confusion. ° This factor may have served to justify a refusal to clarify the
12. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1944).
13. Ibid.
14. In Minnesota v. Nat'l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940), the Supreme Court was unable
to discern whether or not a tax had been struck down on the basis of state or federal law.
Rather than interfere with the state's jurisdiction, the cause was remanded.
15. Ibid.
16. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
17. In Commonwealth v. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 323, 339 (1966), Judge Lord recognized
that he was obligated to follow the Pennsylvania courts' interpretation of the Public
Accomodations Act. He subsequently decided, however, that the matter had not been con-
sidered by the State Supreme Court.
18. FLA. STAT. Ch. 25, § .031 (1965). The statute permits the Florida Supreme Court
to answer certificates from the federal courts on matters of state law.
19. McKusick, Certification: A Procedure For Cooperation Between State And Federal
Courts, 16 MAmn L. REv. 33 (1964).
20. This confusion is highlighted by the fact that of the three judges who considered
the question of the applicability of the Public Accomodations Act to Girard College, no two
reached a similar conclusion. Judge Lord found that the statute did apply. Cf. discussion
note 8 supra. In re Estate of Girard, 423 Pa. 297, 224 A.2d 761 (1966), Justices Bell
and Musmanno dissented, and urged that a clarification should have been undertaken. Justice
Bell was of the opinion that the earlier Girard cases had found that the Public Accomoda-
tions Act did not extend to the College; Justice Musmanno argued that the scope of the Act
included the College.
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issue. However, in holding that a clarification would be inappropriate,
because of a due regard for the federal-state system, Pennsylvania seems
inconsistent with other national and state attempts to maintain the in-
tegrity of local jurisdiction.
John R. McGinley Jr.
CRIMINAL LAW ARRsT-A police officer may stop and question a per-
son, short of arrest, if the officer has reasonable suspicion, as distinguished
from probable cause to believe, that the person has committed a crime;
and may make a brief frisk of the person for dangerous weapons if the
officer reasonably believes that his personal safety so requires.
Commonwealth v. Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. 1, 223 A.2d 873 (1966).
After receiving a radio report of a burglary, a police officer stopped the
defendant, who was walking several blocks from the burglarized apartment
building. Tenants in the building had reported to police that the intruder
had been a Negro "with a brown coat and a mustache.''' Defendant, a
Negro, was wearing a light-colored coat and needed a shave.2 Incident to
the stop the officer "frisked" defendant and found a three-inch penknife.
Defendant was then arrested,3 and was subsequently booked on the
burglary charge.4 The knife was introduced as evidence, over objection,
at the trial.
The Superior Court ruled that there is nothing unconstitutional in the
brief detention of citizens under circumstances not justifying an arrest
where such is done for the purpose of limited inquiry in the course of
police investigation. Furthermore, a policeman may "frisk" 5 the person
stopped if he believes himself to be in danger from a concealed deadly
weapon. Dangerous weapons discovered by such activity are admissible
in evidence, although such discovery was not incidental to an "arrest."'
1. Commonwealth v. Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. 1, 3, 223 A.2d 873, 875 (1966).
2. Such was the testimony of the police officer who apprehended the defendant.
3. There are two common definitions of arrest. The Pennsylvania Superior Court ap-
parently adopts the view that an arrest does not take place until a person is taken into
custody "so that he may be forthcoming to answer for the commission of a crime." The
other view is that "any deprivation or restraint of a person's liberty is an arrest whether or
not it culminates in the charging of a crime." 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182, 1186 (1952).
4. Finding the knife gave the policeman cause to arrest defendant at least for the
offense of carrying a concealed weapon. This circumstance, added to the fact that the
defendant approximately fit the description given in the police broadcast, may be said to
have established the requisite probable cause to arrest defendant for the burglary. After
being taken into custody the defendant was positively identified by the tenants of the
burglarized apartment building.
5. "Frisking is passing the hands over the outer clothing of a person to make sure that
he has no dangerous weapons concealed on his body." Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28
VA. L. REV. 315, 324 (1942).
6. Note 3, supra.
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